This study explores motivations underlying managers' resource adjustments. We examine asymmetric costs resulting from current resource adjustments made intentionally to meet earnings targets under constraints set by past technology choices aimed to maximize firm value. Findings indicate that early technology choices induce cost stickiness in the absence of incentives to meet earnings targets. Costs exhibit greater stickiness in the presence of hard technological constraints than in the presence of weak technological constraints. However, resource adjustments made intentionally to meet earnings targets wash away, rather than induce, cost stickiness imposed by pre-determined technological constraints, resulting in symmetric costs. The findings suggest that some deliberate decisions induce sticky costs while other deliberate decisions diminish sticky costs depending on the underlying motivations. the ability to adjust resources in response to realized demand is subject to constraints imposed by technology choices made in prior periods. For instance, a choice to acquire a machine made in a past period may restrict the short-run ability to produce above capacity when demand rises, and depreciation costs hold back savings in case of downward adjustments when demand falls. Notwithstanding its importance, the impact of pre-determined constraints on resource adjustments resulting in cost stickiness is not well understood. The objective of this study is to distinguish between two potential sources of sticky costs: deliberate decisions to adjust resources made by self-interested managers and constraints imposed by past technology choices made to maximize firm value. We explore current resource adjustments made intentionally to meet earnings targets under pre-determined technological constraints. Particularly, we examine a potential tension between the two effects on the observed cost stickiness.
Introduction
Managerial decisions resulting in asymmetric cost behavior have recently attracted much attention. Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003, p. 47) , hereafter ABJ, argue that "Sticky costs occur because managers deliberately adjust the resources committed to activities." Understanding how motivations underlying managers' deliberate choices to adjust the resources influence the observed sticky cost behavior is of particular interest to management accounting scholars. The literature, however, has scarcely documented such relationships, perhaps because incentives are neither observable, nor obvious. 1 Moreover, the ability to adjust resources in response to realized demand is subject to constraints imposed by technology choices made in prior periods. For instance, a choice to acquire a machine made in a past period may restrict the short-run ability to produce above capacity when demand rises, and depreciation costs hold back savings in case of downward adjustments when demand falls. Notwithstanding its importance, the impact of pre-determined constraints on resource adjustments resulting in cost stickiness is not well understood. The objective of this study is to distinguish between two potential sources of sticky costs: deliberate decisions to adjust resources made by self-interested managers and constraints imposed by past technology choices made to maximize firm value. We explore current resource adjustments made intentionally to meet earnings targets under pre-determined technological constraints. Particularly, we examine a potential tension between the two effects on the observed cost stickiness.
Self-interested managers adjust resources committed to activities to maximize their personal utility, not the value of the firm (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008) . We examine the impact of current resource adjustments made intentionally to meet earnings targets on the degree of cost stickiness. Findings indicate that managers' choices in adjusting resources that are motivated to avoid losses or earnings decreases diminish sticky costs. Cost stickiness is mitigated in the presence of incentives to meet earnings targets primarily because managers cut resources in response to demand fall at a faster rate than in the absence of these incentives. This result shows that the motivation to meet earnings targets results in deliberate resource adjustments that diminish, rather than induce, sticky costs.
ABJ and Banker, Ciftci and Mashruwala (2008) report that sticky costs occur because managers are slower in making downward resource adjustments than in making upward resource adjustments. These resource adjustments depend on managers' beliefs on future demand, assuming they make optimal decisions to maximize firm value. Focusing on a different motivation, we find that incentives to meet earnings targets result in faster resource adjustments when demand falls than when demand rises; i.e., anti-sticky costs.
Therefore, managers' deliberate resource adjustments result in an increase or decrease in the degree of cost stickiness depending on their motivation.
Next, we investigate the effect of technological constraints imposed by technology choices made in advance on cost stickiness. Firms invest in technologies, including production machinery, labor, and knowledge before those resources are actually utilized.
Technology choices made in advance set constraints and restrict the firm's ability to respond to activity level changes. These technology choices made to maximize firm value impose costs of adjustment to demand realizations (Rothschild, 1971) . Adjustment costs increase costs of adjusting the activity level upward when demand rises and also decrease savings from adjusting the activity level downward when demand falls, i.e., sticky costs.
Accordingly, results indicate that constraints imposed on the firm by technology choices made in advance boost cost stickiness. Particularly, costs exhibit greater stickiness in the presence of hard constraints than in the presence of weak constraints.
The sticky costs model suggested by ABJ recognizes that costs incurred in a current period depend on costs incurred in the previous period and on current beliefs about future demand. We take this approach a step further and document a relationship between costs incurred in a current period and technological constraints set in earlier periods. It is not only previous costs and current beliefs that affect current cost stickiness, but also technology choices made in advance.
Finally, and most interesting, we explore the tension between the two effects that influence cost stickiness. The findings emphasize the importance of understanding the motivations underlying resource adjustments, which result in both symmetric and asymmetric costs.
Second, the findings demonstrate the significant impact of agency-driven incentives on observed sticky costs. The evidence draws attention to a new aspect of prior sticky costs evidence documenting that managerial discretion motivated by profit-maximization considerations influences the degree of cost stickiness (e.g., ABJ; Anderson and Lanen, 2009; Balakrishnan and Gruca, 2008) . Ignoring the impact of agency considerations on observed sticky cost behavior may bias the inferences due to an omitted correlated variable problem.
The paper proceeds as follows. Hypotheses are developed in the next section. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents the sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides the empirical results and Section 6 summarizes.
Hypotheses Development
Understanding how deliberate decisions to adjust resources stem from managers' motivations is a topic of interest to accounting researchers. Particularly, choices to cut resources made by self-interested managers have drawn much attention. Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008) report that managers reduce costs to avoid losses and earnings decreases. A vast body of evidence indicates that agency considerations lead managers to reduce costs to meet various benchmarks (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Baber et al., 1991; Bushee, 1998 ). Yet, the influence of resource adjustments made intentionally to meet earnings targets on the degree of cost stickiness is not known.
Following prior studies, we assume that incentives to meet earnings targets lead managers to accelerate resource cutting to achieve cost savings when demand falls as well as restrain consumption of resources to supply an increasing demand. That is, incentives to meet earnings targets are expected to speed up cost savings when activity level decreases and hold down costs when activity level increases. As a result, cost stickiness is expected to be lessened in the presence of incentives to meet earnings targets.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 1 . Suppose a firm produces a single product and Y t-1 is the activity level in period t-1. For simplicity, we assume that realized activity level in period t is either low, Y L <Y t-1 , or high, Y H >Y t-1 . In the case of low activity level realization and a motivation to meet some earnings target in period t, managers push hard on cutting resources to increase cost savings and save more that the average cost per unit incurred in period t-1. Similarly, in the case of high activity level realization and a motivation to meet some earnings target in period t, managers slow down resource consumption and produce extra volume at a lower average cost per unit than in period t- Greater adjustment costs entail higher costs of adjusting the activity level upward when demand rises but also result in lower savings from adjusting the activity level downward when demand falls. Figure 2 depicts this argument. The figure demonstrates that greater costs of adjustment result in stickier costs. Accordingly, a less flexible technology characterized by higher adjustment costs triggers cost stickiness.
[ Figure 2 about here ]
In sum, lower demand uncertainty results in choosing less flexible technologies with higher adjustment costs, resulting in more sticky costs. We employ demand uncertainty as a proxy for constraints imposed by past technology choices that influence cost stickiness.
H2: Constraints imposed on the firm by past technology choices made to
accommodate lower demand uncertainty result in more sticky costs.
The hypothesis should not be confused with prior evidence on other aspects of the relationship between uncertainty and firms' cost behavior. First, ABJ and Banker, Ciftci and Mashruwala (2008) show increased cost stickiness when managers evaluate a current decline in demand to be temporary. In these two studies, the effect is driven by a current decision to maintain resources given some beliefs on future demand. By contrast, we employ demand uncertainty known in a prior period to gain insights into how earlier technology choices constrain current adjustments, which result in asymmetric cost behavior. Later in the study we examine the incremental impact of the two separate effects on cost stickiness. There is no reason to believe that the above two hypotheses are independent. Current choices of cutting resources to meet earnings targets depend on technology choices made in advance. For example, an early choice of a technology with high adjustment costs; i.e., hard constraints, is likely to impede managers' ability to adjust resources to meet their earnings targets. In exploring this potential tension, we examine whether current motivation to meet earnings targets impacts the degree of cost stickiness imposed by technological constraints set in advance. The following hypothesis is stated for convenience only and is not an ex ante prediction:
H3:
Incentives to meet earnings targets diminish sticky costs imposed by predetermined technological constraints.
Research Design
This study explores two potential sources of sticky costs: (1) motivation to meet earnings targets underlying current decisions to adjust resources, (2) The independent variables are log change of sales revenue (REV), and log change of REV multiplied by an indicator variable that equals 1 if REV it <REV i,t-1 and 0 otherwise (REVDEC it ). The regression model is:
In the ABJ framework, the coefficient β 1 measures the level of variable costs, 3 indicating the variation of operating costs with sales revenue. Therefore, β 1 +β 2 measures the percentage change in operating costs resulting from a 1% decrease in sales revenue. ABJ and a series of subsequent studies report a significantly positive coefficient β 1 , and a significantly negative coefficient β 2 using various samples and contexts. They claim that a significantly negative coefficient β 2 indicates sticky cost behavior. In estimating all the cross-sectional regression models, we exploit 3 We use the level of variable costs to express the percentage increase in costs with 1% increase in sales revenue (ABJ, p. 52).
potential differences among time periods by computing coefficients and t-statistics for each year as in Fama and MacBeth (1973) , reporting mean across-years coefficient estimates and the associated t-statistic.
3.1 SUB-SAMPLE ANALYSES
TESTING H1: INCENTIVES TO MEET EARNINGS TARGETS
Testing whether resource adjustments made intentionally to meet earnings targets diminish cost stickiness, we follow Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) in identifying the presence of such incentives.
They argue that firm-years in the interval just right of zero tend to reduce their costs to report income marginally above zero.
Consequently, we group firm-years into intervals based on net income scaled by market capitalization at the beginning of the year. To increase the power of our tests, we concentrate on firm-years in the interval to the immediate right of zero, the suspect firmyears. Following prior studies, we examine a suspect firm-years interval, having net income scaled by market capitalization that is greater than or equal to zero but less than or equal to 0.01. Similarly, we identify incentives to avoid earnings decreases by grouping firm-years into intervals based on changes in net income scaled by market capitalization at the beginning of the year. Again, the interval width is 0.01 and we concentrate on firm-years in the interval to the immediate right of zero, the suspect firmyears. We estimate model (1) for sub-samples of observations with and without incentives to avoid losses and compute mean coefficient estimates across years as in Fama and MacBeth (1973 
COMPREHENSIVE REGRESSION ANALYSES
We extend the ABJ framework to further test the three hypotheses. Rather than employ sub-samples, we estimate comprehensive regression models, which allow for direct tests of multiple effects and interactions between them. We also add control variables used in prior studies. First, ABJ report less sticky costs in periods where revenue also declined in the preceding period. The reason is that managers are likely to consider a revenue decline to be more permanent when it occurs in a second consecutive period of revenue declines, resulting in a motivation to scale down resources. Thus, we control for successive revenue decreases. Second, adjustment costs tend to be higher when the firm relies more on self-owned assets and employees than on materials and services purchased from external suppliers. Following prior studies (ABJ; Banker, Cifitci, and Mashruwala, 2008), we control for asset intensity and employee intensity.
TESTING H1: INCENTIVES TO MEET EARNINGS TARGETS
We estimate the following regression model for testing the impact of both incentives to avoid losses and incentives to avoid earnings decreases on the degree of cost stickiness:
where LOSS it is an indicator variable that equals 1 if annual earnings deflated by market value at the beginning of the year (Compustat #172 t /(Compustat #199 t-1 xCompustat #25 t-1 )) is in the interval (0, 0.01), and 0 otherwise.
EDEC it is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in annual earnings deflated by market capitalization of shareholders equity at prior year end is in the interval (0, 0.01), and 0 otherwise.
Control variables are as follows: SUCDEC it is an indicator variable that equals 1 if revenue in year t-1 is less than in year t-2 and 0 otherwise. ASSET it is a ratio of total assets to sales revenues, and EMP it is a ratio of the number of employees to sales revenue.
If incentives to avoid losses and to avoid earnings decreases diminish cost stickiness then we expect γ 21 >0 and γ 22 >0.
TESTING H2: TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS SET IN PRIOR PERIODS
Testing H2, we use an indicator variable to facilitate a regression model which differentiates between hard technological constraints and weak technological constraints.
In each year, we split the sample into two sub-samples with observations above and below the median value of VREV. We construct DVREV i,t-1 , an indicator variable that equals 1 if VREV i,t-1 is above the annual median (weak constraints) and 0 otherwise in year t-1. We employ DVREV to estimate the following regression model:
If H2 holds, weak constraints imposed on the firm by past technology choices made to accommodate greater demand uncertainty result in less sticky costs. Therefore we predict, λ 2 >0.
TESTING H3: DO INCENTIVES TO MEET EARNINGS TARGETS DIMINISH STICKY COSTS IMPOSED BY PRE-DETERMINED TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS?
Exploring a joint effect of choices to adjust resources made intentionally to meet earnings targets on cost stickiness under hard versus weak constraints, we estimate the following regression model:
If choices to adjust resources made to avoid losses (earnings decreases) diminish cost stickiness imposed by hard technological constraints set in advance then γ 21 >0 (γ 22 >0). Similarly, for the case of weak technological constraints, H3 predicts γ 21 + η 21 >0 (γ 22 + η 22 >0).
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The sample includes all public firms covered by Compustat and CRSP during . We follow Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] , ABJ and Roychowdhury [2006] in using annual data for our tests. We exclude financial institutions and public utilities (4-digit SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999) because the structure of their financial statements is incompatible with those of other companies. The sample includes firm-year observations with positive values for sales revenue, total assets, book value, and market value. We also require share price at fiscal year end to be greater than $1 and delete firmyear observations with missing data on two preceding years (t-1, t-2).
To limit the effect of extreme observations, each year we rank the sample according to the variables in the regression models and remove the extreme 0.5 percent of the observations on each side. The sample includes 97,547 firm-year observations for 11,758 different firms. Table 1 provides details on the sample selection.
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[ Table 1 about here ]
Comparing the descriptive statistics of our sample reported in table 2 with the ABJ sample, the firms in our sample are larger due to differences in sampling criteria (mean sales of $1,809 million compared to $1,277 million in ABJ). Yet, our sample shows similar frequency of sales declines (27.4% versus 27.0% in ABJ). Table 2 also presents descriptive statistics of the incentive dummy variables. There are 3,216 suspect firmyears (3.3% of the sample) with incentives to avoid losses and 9,409 suspect firm-years (9.7% of the sample) with incentives to avoid earnings decreases.
[ Table 2 about here ] Absent incentives to meet earnings targets, managers adjust resources downwards at a slower rate than they adjust them upwards, resulting in sticky costs. The introduction of these incentives changes the pattern to symmetric costs. Overall, the findings support H1
Empirical Results

SUB-SAMPLE ANALYSES
and indicate that incentives to meet earnings targets diminish cost stickiness, resulting in symmetric costs.
[ Table 3 [ Table 4 about here ]
Testing H3, we estimate the impact of resource adjustments made intentionally to avoid losses (earnings decreases) on the degree of cost stickiness in the presence of technological constraints set in advance. In each year, we split the sample into subsamples with hard and weak technological constraints using DVREV it and then split each sub-sample into observations with and without incentives to avoid losses (avoid earnings decreases) using LOSS it (EDEC it ).
Mean coefficient estimates for β 2 from estimating model 1 ( [ Table 5 about here ]
The results offer another noteworthy insight on the differential impact of the agency considerations on cost stickiness given hard versus weak pre-determined technological constraints. Absent agency considerations, costs exhibit greater stickiness in the presence of hard constraints than in the presence of weak constraints. Specifically, the difference in However, this pattern does not hold in the presence of incentives to meet earnings targets.
Costs exhibit symmetric behavior given either incentives to avoid losses or incentives to avoid earnings decreases, regardless of the technological constraints. We conclude that resource adjustments encouraged by personal goals influence cost behavior above and beyond those imposed by pre-determined technological constraints. Overall, the effect of agency considerations on the degree of cost stickiness overcomes the effect of technological constraints.
COMPREHENSIVE REGRESSION ANALYSES
We estimate comprehensive regression models to further corroborate the evidence. indicating that operating costs are, on average, sticky.
[ Table 6 about here ] Checking the sensitivity of the findings, we employed an alternative earnings deflator.
Durtschi and Easton (2005) investigate distributions of scaled earnings and report differences between the shape of the distribution of earnings scaled by total assets and the shape of the distribution of earnings scaled by market capitalization. Therefore, we computed the intervals of suspect firm-years with earnings scaled by total assets (rather than market capitalization) and replicated the analyses. In addition, we replicated the analyses using different intervals sizes of (0, 0.005) and (0, 0.02). The results (not reported for brevity) remain essentially the same.
Overall, the results support H1 by showing that incentive to meet earnings targets result in resource adjustments that wash away sticky cost behavior. The results support meaningful evidence that the extent of sticky costs is at least partly driven by managers' intentional choices motivated by agency considerations.
Testing H2, results from estimating regression model 3 are presented in table 6. The mean effect of weak pre-determined technological constraints proxied by high (above median) demand uncertainty on the degree of cost stickiness is λ 2 =0.0485, significant at the 0.06 level. Thus, more flexible technologies featuring low adjustment costs, which impose weak constraints on firms, induce anti-sticky costs. The findings support H2.
Checking the sensitivity of the results to the proposed demand uncertainty measure, we estimate regression model 3 employing two alternative demand uncertainty measures.
We use (i) VREV deflated by average sales revenue, and (ii) the variation of deflated sales revenue (by market value of equity). The results are essentially the same and confirm the findings. Additionally, we replicate the estimations when the indicator [ Table 7 about here ]
Results with respect to the control variables are in line with prior studies. Mean coefficient estimates with respect to successive decreases in sales revenue, asset intensity and employee intensity are positive and significant across all regressions. The results demonstrate that the effects of both pre-determined constraints and incentives to meet earnings targets on sticky costs hold when controlled for determinants of sticky costs reported in the literature.
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In sum, the evidence shows that incentives to meet earnings targets as well as technological constraints incrementally and jointly affect sticky cost behavior. These effects are economically meaningful and statistically significant. 
2. See table 2 for definitions of variables.
3. *, **, *** -denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 3. *, **, *** -denote significance of difference from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
4. The average number of observations in each quintile is 16,160. -0.0584*** (-3.37) *Notes 1. We split our sample into four sub-samples. First, we use demand uncertainty in the preceding year (VREV t-1 ) to sort the sample into low versus high demand uncertainty. Then, we sort each of the two sub-samples into observations with and without incentives to avoid losses (Panel A) and with and without incentives to avoid earnings decreases (Panel B). We estimate regression 1 separately in each of the four sub-samples, for each year as in Fama and MacBeth (1973 
